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When positive and negative income are treated asymmetrically under a corporate 
income tax (CIT) without allowance for group taxation, a group of afﬁ  liated corpora-
tions may engage in tax avoidance by shifting income from proﬁ  table to unproﬁ  table 
subsidiaries for the sole purpose of minimising the sum of tax liabilities of the group 
members. The aim of this paper is to offer systematic evidence on the behavioural 
response to a tax penalty that arises from doing business in multiple entities, in order 
to provide justiﬁ  cation for group tax systems such as consolidated ﬁ  ling and loss 
transfer. The setting for our investigation is the Japanese CIT before the introduc-
tion of a group tax system. We develop a theoretical model of a corporate group 
that predicts a difference in proﬁ  t reporting behaviour between subsidiaries above 
and below 100 million yen in paid-in capital due to the progressive feature of the 
Japanese CIT. We test the implications of the model with a company-level data on 
subsidiaries based on survey that covers over 1,700 corporate groups headed by 
large corporations. The sample consists of 33,340 subsidiary-time pairs from 1988, 
1990, and 1992. We ﬁ  nd evidence consistent with a hypothesis that corporate groups 
shift income among group members. The ﬁ  nding underscores the importance of 
accounting for the group behaviour in the design of CIT.
Introduction
It is common practice for a ﬁ  rm to organise its businesses as legally distinct corporations 
for several efﬁ  ciency reasons; to tie managers’ pay to performance, separate entities may 
be preferable to internal divisions (Holemström and Roberts 1998); to avoid negative 
synergy, it may be necessary to separate conﬂ  icting business activities (John and Ofek 
1995); to control the risk of new ventures, investors may utilise the limited liability status 
of corporations. Despite the efﬁ  ciency grounds for organizing activities in separate entities, 
in the vast majority of nations, there is a tax penalty for forming a corporate group. Of 
121 countries listed in PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002), 92 countries tax corporations 
separately from group members, while 29 countries allow for group taxation.1 Since a 
stand-alone entity can only partially offset its own proﬁ  t with losses made by its afﬁ  li-
ates in the absence of group provisions, the tax liability of a corporate group would be 
greater than that of a conglomerate when some member companies are making losses.2 
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There are loss-offset provisions moderating the degree of penalty, but they are known 
to be imperfect (Altshuler and Auerback 1990). As a result, there are concerns about 
the behavioural response to avoid the penalty and about the consequences on efﬁ  ciency: 
ﬁ  rms may waste resources through engineering transactions of which the sole aim is to 
shift income from proﬁ  table to unproﬁ  table corporations; ﬁ  rms may choose a suboptimal 
form of organisation due to concern about the tax penalty.
  To highlight the perverse incentives under a tax system that lacks group provi-
sions, this paper aims to provide evidence from a large-scale dataset on the behavioural 
response to tax penalties, taking the Japanese tax system of the early 1990s as a setting. 
The focus is on the incentives to shift income among domestic afﬁ  liates, a type of behav-
iour under-studied in the ﬁ  eld. Certainly, there is extensive evidence on income shifting 
in the international context (Grubert and Mutti 1991; Hines and Rice 1994; Grubert 
and Slemrod 1998), where the differences in tax rates across countries create opportu-
nity for tax avoidance. Here, the differences in marginal tax rates between proﬁ  table and 
unproﬁ  table corporations create the incentives to shift income.
  The key distinction between these two types of income shifting is that, unlike the 
tax shelters involving offshore tax havens, which is a problem in itself, the income shifting 
among domestic afﬁ  liates can be viewed as a symptom of problems with the tax system, 
provided that the shifting takes place in groups where there are efﬁ  ciency grounds for 
organising businesses in multiple entities.3 In this view, the policy implication is that 
rather than strengthen enforcement efforts, the tax law should be amended to account 
for business practices.
  Our examination of within-jurisdiction income shifting adds to a relatively small 
number of previous empirical studies (Giudici and Paleari 1998; Gramlich et al. 2004; 
Jung et al., 2007). In a closely related study, Gramlich et al. (2004) examine the income 
shifting among the members of bank-centered corporate groups, or horizontal keiretsu, in 
Japan. Our setting is also on Japan but our study focuses on a different type of grouping, 
sometimes referred to as a capital keiretsu, which is a group of businesses consisting of a 
parent company, subsidiaries and afﬁ  liates.4 The latter type of grouping is tightly integrated: 
the members of capital keiretsu reports consolidated ﬁ  nancial statements since 1978; the 
members of horizontal keiretsu do not. The focus on capital keiretsu is conducive to the 
examination of tax-motivated income shifting since there would be smaller transaction 
costs in sharing the beneﬁ  ts of tax saving.
  The context of the study is the Japanese corporate income tax (CIT) prior to the 
introduction of group taxation in April 2002. One advantage of the Japanese setting is 3
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that an available data on corporate groups, Afﬁ  liated Company Data, contains a large 
number of individual observations on parents and their domestic subsidiaries, a type of 
data that is relatively rare.5 Naturally, the diversity of CIT around the world preclude 
the direct extrapolation of the results from this study, but there is a number of generic 
features of the Japanese CIT that make the discussion in this study relevant to the policy 
debate in countries that do not adopt group taxation.
  Another advantage of the Japanese setting is on its institutional features that provide 
a "natural experiment". The previous empirical studies on income shifting by multi-national 
corporations utilise the variation in tax rates across jurisdictions. Such an identiﬁ  cation 
strategy is not readily applicable in the context of within-jurisdiction income shifting. 
We suggest and implement an identiﬁ  cation strategy that utilises the progressive feature 
of the Japanese CIT in detecting the spread of income shifting. The intuition underlying 
the test is as follows.
  For "large" corporations with paid-in capital above 100 million yen, the corporate tax 
is proportional to proﬁ  t, with at best only a partial offset for losses. For groups containing 
some large corporations with losses but making overall proﬁ  ts, there is an incentive to shift 
enough proﬁ  ts to the large corporations with losses to the extent possible, thereby raising 
proﬁ  ts to zero. Any further shifting creates no tax saving, yet involves real costs. On the 
other hand, for small corporations with paid-in capital of 100 million yen or less, the tax 
rate is reduced on the ﬁ  rst 8 million yen of income, and the remaining income is taxed 
at the same rate as that of large corporations. Because of this progressive tax schedule, 
there is an incentive to shift more than the amount of the losses that small corporations 
make, so as to exploit the rate reduction. Thus, the income shifting hypothesis implies 
that the higher propensity for large corporations to report zero proﬁ  t when other factors 
are held constant.
  We test the implications with a company-level data on subsidiaries based on sur-
vey that covers over 1,700 corporate groups headed by large corporations. The sample 
consists of 33,340 subsidiary-time pairs from 1988, 1990, and 1992. Controlling for 
company characteristics in a binary response model, large subsidiaries have higher pro-
pensity to report zero proﬁ  t, consistent with the prediction based on the tax institution 
that puts a cap on shifting for large corporations at zero proﬁ  t but not on that for small 
corporations. The difference is modest, however; after several speciﬁ  cation tests, we put 
the bound to 0.5–2.7 percentage points. The difference in the propensities to report zero 
proﬁ  t is two to three times as large in the ﬁ  nancial-insurance sector as in the other sectors 
of the economy, in line with the prediction that the restriction on an alternative avoid-4
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ance strategy renders income shifting more attractive. There is also a higher propensity 
for tightly controlled subsidiaries to report zero proﬁ  t, consistent with the notion that 
the costs of shifting are affected by the degree of control. Excluding proﬁ  table groups 
increases the point estimates; at least part of the increase is attributable to the tax incen-
tives. Thus, there seem sufﬁ  cient indications to conclude that the income shifting was 
pervasive among large Japanese corporate groups over the period of our study.
  The literature on horizontal keiretsu emphasizes the risk sharing as one of the 
main function of the grouping (Nakatani 1984).6 The empirical strategy to test the risk 
sharing hypothesis is based on the comparison of the variance of proﬁ  tability between 
group members and non-group members, interpreting the low variance of group-afﬁ  liated 
companies as due to risk sharing. Notice that some of the documented low variances may 
be attributable to tax-motivated income shifting but the hypotheses are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. If, for instance, a dollar of ﬁ  nancial assistance to a group member in 
distress reduces the tax liability of the group by t dollars, the tax motive re-enforces the 
risk sharing motive. In a recent survey of business groups by Khanna and Yafeh (2007), 
for instance, little attention is given to tax considerations. Our paper adds to the literature 
by indicating the inﬂ  uences of taxes on the degree of intra-group transfers.
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the tax incentives generated 
by the Japanese CIT of 1988-92. Section 3 examines the tax incentives with a model 
of a corporate group. Section 4 outlines the empirical approach. Section 5 presents the 
analysis. Section 6 draws conclusions.
Institution
Tax incentives
There are two generic features of tax institutions that give rise to the tax penalty in 
forming corporate groups: the separate tax ﬁ  ling of group members and the asymmetric 
treatment of positive and negative income. Corporations are generally taxed on their 
positive income but they do not receive full credit on negative income. The deductibility 
of loss is partial, in that corporations with negative income do not receive tax credits 
immediately. If group members are taxed separately, they cannot offset proﬁ  ts made by 
some members with losses incurred by others. Thus, in a given year, the tax base under 
separate ﬁ  ling is no smaller than that under consolidated ﬁ  ling where the group is taxed 
on the combined income.7 Under the Japanese CIT of 1988, the effective tax rate is 56 5
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per cent, so that a dollar of income shifted from proﬁ  table corporations to unproﬁ  table 
corporations reduces the tax liability by 56 cents.8 Therefore, the tax penalty can be a 
signiﬁ  cant disincentive to the formation of corporate groups.
  There are various complementary institutional arrangements that alleviate the degree 
of tax penalties, including the deductibility of losses across years.9 Under the Japanese 
CIT, qualiﬁ  ed corporations may carry back losses for one year and receive a commensurate 
tax refund for that year. They may choose to carry forward losses up to ﬁ  ve years, and 
receive tax credits in future years.10 Since the disadvantage of carrying losses forward is 
that they are carried with zero nominal interest and may expire unused (Altshuler and 
Auerbach 1990), these provisions reduce the incentives for income shifting but not 
entirely. Another institutional arrangement is the deductibility of intra-group contribu-
tion. The Scandinavian nations have formal allowances: Norway treats the contribution 
to companies in which parents hold more than ninety per cent of the direct or indirect 
common ownership as deductible expense.11 Japan has no such formal allowance, but 
donations, which include intra-group transfers, are deductible up to a limit.12 This form 
of shifting transaction is legal and can be arranged with minor transaction costs.13  
  To shift income beyond the amount of tax-deductible contributions, a ﬁ  rm would 
need to arrange intra-group transactions that are analogous to the income shifting strategies 
in the international setting; carefully setting transfer pricing and arranging intra-company 
loans (Grubert 2003). The strategy may also involve changing the timing of transaction.14 
These means would be costly, given the accounting costs and the risk of getting caught 
by tax inspectors.15
To merge or not to merge
By merging a subsidiary, the group may save on taxes when losses arising from the sub-
sidiary’s business can offset the proﬁ  t made by the merging company. Since the group 
does not incur further costs of shifting income, for the purpose of tax planning, it may 
seem attractive to merge a loss-making subsidiary rather than to retain a separate or-
ganisational form. There would certainly be cases where tax-motivated mergers being a 
superior tax planning strategy. When tax-motivated mergers are widely practiced, income 
shifting would be an irrelevant consideration. But this begs a question: for the purpose 
of avoiding the tax penalty, why do not ﬁ  rms do business as a conglomerate rather than 
as separate entities?
  To the extent that corporate groups considered in this study overlap with business 6
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groups studied extensively, the reasons for the group formation can be found in the various 
hypotheses explored in the literature on business groups (Khanna and Yafeh 2007), such 
as risk sharing, costly contracting environment, expropriation of minority shareholders, 
and family considerations. Our data, for instance, included a group where the founder’s 
two sons are heads of two different group companies; perhaps the arrangement facilitates 
the management of family relations as well as businesses. When there are business reasons 
for maintaining separate business entities, the tax advantage of a conglomerate may not 
justify mergers, since a ﬁ  rm would weigh the tax advantage with transaction costs (Scholes 
et al. 2002).
  In addition, there are several institutional hindrances to tax-motivated mergers 
in Japan. Perhaps the clearest is the regulatory restrictions. Under the banking law and 
the insurance business law, ﬁ  nancial and insurance parents are prevented from directly 
undertaking periphery activities including leasing, credit card operation, and credit 
guarantee but are allowed to establish subsidiaries and to conduct a regulated range of 
activities through them. Thus, a tax-motivated merger is not a feasible option for ﬁ  nance 
and insurance parents.
  The tax consequence of a merger is not necessarily favourable. First, there are 
various small business provisions under the Japanese CIT, and because subsidiaries are 
taxed separately from their parents in most cases, the tax base can increase from a merger. 
Second, some of the well-known tax avoidance strategies utilise the group structure.16 
Third, out of concern about abusive tax planning, merging companies are not permitted 
to take over losses carried forward by merged companies (Kaneko 2003).17 Since any 
unused credits accumulated by merged companies are lost in the process, the rule reduces 
the incentives to merge.18 In sum, the relevance of income shifting as a strategy to avoid 
tax penalty is somewhat diminished by the possibility of merger but not to the extent of 
rendering the strategy irrelevant.
Theoretical Model
This section outlines the tax incentives generated by the Japanese CIT with a model of 
a corporate group. For tractability, we focus on the static setting to abstract away from 
loss-carry provisions and assume the group’s choice of organisational form as exogenous 
so that the possibility of merger does not complicate the exposition. Further, we consider 
the case of a two-member group in which one corporation is proﬁ  table but the other is 
not. The focus on two-member groups is not overly unrealistic, since for the population 
of corporations surveyed under the 2001 Establishment and Enterprise Census in Japan, 7
No. 371, 2008
the average number of members is 3.5. However, Afﬁ  liated Company Data contains large 
corporate groups with the number of members reaching up to 342 for Mitsui & Co., 
Ltd., and we will note a consideration about generalising to larger corporate groups at 
the end of the section.
  Let us deﬁ  ne a ﬁ  rm consisting of two corporations, Company 1 (parent) and Com-
pany 2 (subsidiary). Their underlying incomes  y,y 12 ^h  are determined exogenously and 
the parent is proﬁ  table and the subsidiary is running at a loss  y >0>y 12 ^h . Their incomes 
are taxed separately; hence unless the ﬁ  rm shifts income, there is a tax penalty. Further, 
let us focus on the case where the amount of shifting is not capped by the parent’s proﬁ  t. 
The following condition on overall income,
  > yy m 1 H1 2 -+ x ^h          ( 1 )
rules out such a corner solution, whether the subsidiary is small or large. m is the tax 
threshold to be deﬁ  ned below. The following are after-tax proﬁ  ts of the parent and sub-
sidiary.
  ; ys g sT ys g s k 11 1 1 =- - - - - r ^^ _ hh i      ( 2 )
  ; ys T ys k 22 2 2 =+ - + r ^h         ( 3 )
> s 0 is the amount of income shifted from the parent to the subsidiary. gs ^h  is the cost 
of shifting income. It is assumed that the parent incurs the transaction costs, which are 
tax deductible. gs ^h  is a quadratic function of the amount shifted based on the standard 







^h            ( 4 )
In this formulation, shifting costs are high if the amount shifted is large relative to the 
average size  yy y 12 2
1 =+ r _ ` ij It also depends on the degree of control exerted by the 
parent, which is represented by  >0 } . The tax liability  . T^h is a function of before-tax 
proﬁ  t  i
b r ^h  and the level of paid-in capital (ki, in million yen). In practice, there are two 
different tax schedules, and their applicability depends on the level of paid-in capital.  
  ;> , max Tk 100 0 H i
b
i i
b = rx r ^h 6 @        ( 5 )





b G =- + rx r x r x ^ ^ h h 7 A    (6)
Like a payoff function of a call option (Majd and Myers 1987), large corporations pay 
proportional tax on their positive income (5). Small corporations pay at the reduced rate 
L x  on their ﬁ  rst m million yen of income and at  H x  on the amount exceeding m million 8
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yen (6). Under the 1989 law, 0.560 H = x ,  .a n d m 04 0 5 8 L == x  and  HL = xx  .19 In 
this analysis, the parent is assumed to be a large corporation. The subsidiary may be small 
or large. Here, we will focus on the case where the subsidiary is small, since the case of 
a large subsidiary is a special case where  HL = xx  .  
Under the income shifting hypothesis, the group chooses the amount of shifting to 
maximise the after-tax group proﬁ  t  12 + rr ^h . The optimisation problem is equivalent 
to the following.
,, , s max max Max gs s s m m 00 HL H L s
bb b
12 2 -- - - + xr xr x r x ^^ ^ ^ _ hh h h i 7 8 A B %/  (7)
Simply put, the ﬁ  rm chooses the amount of shifting by weighing tax savings versus shifting 
costs. The objective function is not readily differentiable, but by imposing appropriate 
constrains on s, sub-problems can be solved algebraically. Appendix 1 details the deriva-
tion of the solution (8). 










xx } rr cm < F )3    (8)
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the optimal level of shifting and the param-
eters affecting the ease of shifting.
Figure 1: Illustration of the optimal shifting schedules
  The solution function for small subsidiaries has two steps as shown by the solid 
line. The solution function for large subsidiaries is ﬂ  at at  y2   as shown by the dotted 
line. In general, the optimal shifting is weakly decreasing in shifting costs  / 1 } _i  and in 
relative size  / yy 2 r _i . In addition, the solution is a weakly increasing function of the tax 
rate facing the parent and the progressiveness of the tax system (that is,  i.e., HL - xx ^h ). 9
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  The model illustrates the difference in the predicted pattern of shifting by subsidi-
ary size. For large subsidiaries, the amount of shifting is capped at y2  , indicating the 
natural limit; at the amount  y2  , where the subsidiary reports zero proﬁ  t, the subsidiary 
faces the tax rate of  H x  at the margin, the same rate as that faced by the parent. Small 
subsidiaries, in contrast, face the marginal rate of  L x  at zero proﬁ  t. Shifting beyond  y2  
is optimal when the underlying shifting costs are sufﬁ  ciently low. Therefore, the amount 
of income shifted into small subsidiaries is not necessarily limited to the amount of losses 
unlike large subsidiaries.
  One insight from the model is that there is a range of shifting costs for which the 
zero proﬁ  t is optimal for a small subsidiary. This implies that the clustering of small cor-
porations at zero proﬁ  t is a possibility. Further, if there are other loss-making subsidiaries 
in group, losses in another company shelter remain income for higher tax saving, thus 
rendering shifting beyond  y2  into a small subsidiary unattractive.20 Because of these 
theoretical possibilities, it may be difﬁ  cult to observe the differences in reported proﬁ  ts 
across size groups in practice, but in the absence of knowledge about the parameters of 
the cost function, this is an empirical question.
  As a preliminary examination, we plot histograms of proﬁ  ts around zero by the size 
of corporation to see if there are differences in proﬁ  t reporting pattern (Figure 2). The 
left-hand side is for corporations at and below 100 million yen in paid-in capital. Recall 
that this group has no unambiguous incentive to restrict shifting up to zero proﬁ  t. The 
proﬁ  t distribution is half-pyramid shaped; the highest fraction of samples occurs in the 
zero-proﬁ  t bin, with progressively declining fractions on the right and with a sharp decline 
on the left. The right-hand panel is for large corporations. Unlike in the histogram for 
small corporations, the distribution is much ﬂ  atter with an apparent clustering at zero. 
It seems natural to observe the high fraction of zero-proﬁ  t corporations in the sample of 
small corporations. But there does not seem to be an apparent reason to expect causing 
the clustering at the zero proﬁ  t for the large corporations. This evidence is in line with 
the model that predicts a cap to the income shifting at zero-proﬁ  t for larger corporations, 
but not for smaller corporations.2110
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Empirical Approach
Our empirical approach focuses on a particular aspect of the proﬁ  t distribution: the inci-
dence of zero proﬁ  t. The choice is based on theoretical as well as practical considerations. 
First, the theoretical model predicts that the shifting is capped at the zero proﬁ  t for large 
corporations but not necessarily capped for small corporations. Thus, the extent to which 
corporations report zero proﬁ  t would be affected by the corporate size, if tax considerations 
are important. Second, it would be ideal to compare the observed distribution of large 
corporations’ proﬁ  t with what would have prevailed had there been no tax discontinuity. 
In the absence of such counter-factual data, we are forced to make comparison with the 
proﬁ  t distribution of small corporations.22 Naturally, large corporations are likely to report 
larger proﬁ  t since most of them would not have became large unless their business was 
successful. Thus, to properly compare the pattern of proﬁ  t reporting, the analysis would 
require a control for the corporate size, along with controls for other company charac-
teristics. We chose to focus on the incidence of zero-proﬁ  t reporting, since it allows us 
to frame the analysis in a transparent way; the assumptions underlying the identiﬁ  cation 
would be apparent in a simple binary response model.
  Put differently, our analysis is a generalisation of the visual inspection presented 
above. The visual inspection indicated what seems to be an unusual distribution of large 
corporations’ proﬁ  ts: the fraction of corporations reporting zero proﬁ  t seems unnaturally 
high. We test to see whether there is a statistically signiﬁ  cant difference and whether the 
pattern remains after controlling for company characteristics. Further, to the extent that 
the tax incentives have signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on reported proﬁ  ts, we would expect to ob-
serve correlation between the shifting costs and the incidence of zero proﬁ  ts. The binary 
Figure 2: The distribution of proﬁ  ts by the size of paid-in capital11
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response model allows us to incorporate such considerations in a simple manner.
Data
We use the Afﬁ  liated Company Data, a survey of large corporations conducted by a private 
publishing company, Toyo Keizai. It contains information on group companies including 
after-tax book proﬁ  t, paid-in capital, number of workers, sales and contact details. Ide-
ally, we would like to observe the tax income ﬁ  led with the National Tax Agency, but the 
available data is after-tax accounting proﬁ  t. The discrepancies between these two notions 
of corporate income arise from, among other things, the differences in the deﬁ  nitions of 
costs and in the treatment of timing.23 To account for this issue, we deﬁ  ne zero proﬁ  t in 
several ways to assess the sensitivity of estimates. The dataset is constructed from three 
surveys conducted in 1989, 1991, and 1993. We omit subsidiaries deemed to be inactive 
at the time of survey from the dataset to ensure that zero proﬁ  t is not due to inactivity. 
Some observations are reported twice in the same year because some sub-groups of larger 
groups are surveyed separately. We removed overlapping observations from the larger 
group and retained the sub-groups. Table 1 presents summary statistics.
Empirical Model
The following model (empirical model) postulates that the probability of subsidiary       
reporting zero proﬁ  t is a function of observable characteristics Xi. 
 
X















    (9)
. f^h is assumed to be a normal density in the main analysis but logistic density is tried. 
The dependent variable is the indicator for subsidiary i reporting zero proﬁ  t. In the 
main analysis, zero proﬁ  t is deﬁ  ned as accounting proﬁ  t in the range (-1 million yen, 1 
million yen).24
  LARGEi is a dummy for paid-in capital of i being larger than 100 million yen. Other 
things held constant, the income shifting hypothesis implies that there would be higher 
propensity for large subsidiaries to report zero proﬁ  t, so the sign on this coefﬁ  cient is 
expected to be positive. It is, however, natural for small corporations to report, on aver-
age, smaller proﬁ  ts than large corporations. We control for the size effect by including 
the natural logarithm of paid-in capital. 
 HOLDINGi is a proxy for shifting costs  } _i  in the theoretical model and is the 12
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per cent of voting stock held within a group, or the sum of voting stock held directly by 
its parent and indirectly by other members. Intuitively, we would expect that the tight 
control would facilitate ﬁ  nancial arrangements to shift income and to share the beneﬁ  t 
of tax savings. Under the theory the propensity to report zero proﬁ  t is expected to be 
higher for tightly controlled corporations, especially those that are also large. The sign 
on the coefﬁ  cients on HOLDING and the interaction term of LARGE and HOLDING 
is expected to be positive.
  One concern with measuring control with the reported level of stock holding is 
window dressing; a parent may artiﬁ  cially keep the stock holding of certain members 
below the statutory limit for reporting consolidated ﬁ  nancial statement to enhance its 
appearance.25
  Table 2 reports the level of holding by industry classiﬁ  cation of parent. In most 
industries, the mean holding level is around 70 per cent; for ﬁ  nancial and insurance par-
ents, the mean is apparently low and the standard deviation is high, reﬂ  ecting Article 11 
of the Antitrust Regulation. Prior to the reforms of 1997, the law restricted banks from 
holding more than a 5 per cent stake in other companies in principle. The upper limit for 
insurance corporations was 10 per cent. However, there are exceptions to this principle; 
upon approval banks and insurance corporations may hold wholly-owned subsidiaries, 
generally in activities integrated with the operation of parents, such as ATM machine 
maintenance, personnel service, maintenance of branch buildings, and bank logistics. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics
  Subsidiaries of  Subsidiaries of  ALL
Variable  F&I Parents   non-F&I Parents  Subsidiaries
PROFIT [mil. Yen]  61.1  81.6  79.7
 (472.2)  (978.8)  (944.3)
HOLDING [%]  42.5  74.4  71.5
 (45)  (29.1)  (32.2)
RELATIVESIZE 0.013  0.028  0.026
 (0.038)  (0.052)  (0.051)
AGE [month]  138.2  234.5  225.9
 (123)  (170.4)  (168.9)
ln(paid-in capital)  233.6  292.9  287.5
 (1162.9)  (6164.8)  (5890.5)
ZEROPROFIT 0.132  0.07  0.076
LARGE 0.187  0.22  0.217
SAME ADDRESS  0.207  0.115  0.123
SAMEREP 0.135  0.19  0.185
N 3,008  30,322  33,340
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. "F&I" refers to ﬁ  nancial and insurance. ZEROPROFIT is 
the indicator for reported proﬁ  t in the range of (-1, 1). SAMEREP is the indicator for subsidiaries that share 
same company representative with another 13
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Many subsidiaries that conduct periphery activities, such as leasing, investments advising, 
and credit card operation, have holding levels as high as the law allows.
Table 2: The percentage of voting shares by industry classiﬁ  cation of parent
Industry Classiﬁ  cation of Parent Company  Average  Std.Dev.  N
Telecomm.,Newspaper,Publishing,Broadcasting 82.5  25.7  165
Agriculture and Fishery  81.9  22.4  186
Communication Equipment  81.4  26.4  515
Precision Instruments  80.8  26.2  463
Paper, Pulp and Allied Products  80.4  25.6  347
Retail 80.0  27.6  1,688
Petroleum and Coal Products  79.3  26.7  303
Real Estate  78.9  28.5  566
Food Products  78.6  27.6  1,526
Nonferrous Metal Products  78.2  27.5  686
Textile Mill Products  78.0  25.6  210
Textile 77.8  28.0  1,171
Pharmaceuticals 76.4  29.5  441
Wholesale 76.2  28.4  3,178
Machinery and Equipment  76.1  29.0  851
Electrical and Electronic Equipment  76.1  29.0  851
Rubber Products  75.2  26.3  155
Service 73.6  29.8  1,174
Land Transportation  73.0  31.0  2,192
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  72.9  28.6  930
Chemical Manufacturing  71.9  28.3  2,519
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products  71.2  30.5  825
Transportation Equipment  71.1  29.7  1,744
Electric and Gas  70.3  29.1  560
Construction 70.2  30.0  2,812
Metal Products  69.7  29.0  851
Water Transportation  68.1  30.1  2,192
Iron and Steel Industries  67.9  29.9  885
Other 66.7  21.0  10
Warehousing and Other Transportation  66.5  30.7  726
Air Transportation  54.6  28.5  239
Financial and Insurance  43.0  45.1  3,131
All Industries  71.6  32.2  34,887
  The standard solution for measurement issues in a linear regression is the instru-
mental variable estimation. But the model is non-linear and we can not apply the solu-
tion even if valid instruments are available (Hauseman 2001). In the absence of a clearly 
established solution, we consider additional variables that would capture shifting costs: 
SAMEADDi is the indicator for the subsidiary that shares an address with another group 
member; SAMEREPi is the indicator for the company representative of the subsidiary      
also being the head of some other group company.
  In principle, the true amount of loss is not observable, so that the average size of 
corporations  / yy 2 r _i  is also not observable. RELATIVESIZEi is a proxy for this variable 
and is deﬁ  ned as the percentage of total group sales accounted for by subsidiary i. We 14
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would expect it is less likely for subsidiaries that are large relative to other group members 
to report zero proﬁ  t. The model suggests that tax rates affect tax incentives but there is 
little variation in tax rates over the sample period.    
 Control  variables  Zi ]g  include age of the company in months, natural logarithm 
of paid-in capital, a dummy for a public company, industry dummies, eight geographic 
region dummies and time dummies. Parent industry dummies are also included for the 
regression except on the sub-sample of the ﬁ  nancial and insurance industry.
Analysis
Baseline speciﬁ  cation
The marginal effects estimated with the baseline probit model is presented in Columns 
1 through 3 in Table 3 for the sample that pools all sectors.26 
Table 3: Baseline probit model
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 pooled  pooled  pooled  Non  F&I  F&I
LARGE = 1  -0.045**  0.047**  0.042**  0.031**  0.147**
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.036)
HOLDING 0.030**  0.016**  0.017**  -0.008*  0.096**
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
RELSIZE  -0.974** -0.496** -0.377** -0.392**  -0.225
  (0.130) (0.092) (0.082) (0.082) (0.379)
AGE   -0.270**  -0.240**  -0.205**  -0.783**
   (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.105)
AGE SQ    0.244**  0.203**  0.152**  0.879**
   (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.189)
PUBLIC   -0.033*  -0.029+    0.324
   (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.225)
LN(PCAP)   -0.029**  -0.027**  -0.023**  -0.057**
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)
YEAR1990     -0.008**  -0.011**  0.017
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
YEAR1992      0.010** 0.007* 0.036**
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.013)
Observations  33340 33340 33340 30332  3008
Pseudo  R-squared  0.05 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ signiﬁ  cant at 10%; * signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%
Column 3-5 include dummies for own industry, headquarter location, and a constant.
Column 3 and 4 also includes parent industry dummies.
PUBLIC is ommitted in non F&I subsample because all public corporations reported non-zero proﬁ  ts.15
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  Without controlling for corporate size in the regression, the coefﬁ  cient on LARGE 
is negative as shown in Column 1. This is as expected: corporations would not likely to 
become large unless they are successful. A control variable for the size—a natural log 
of paid-in capital (PCAP)—turns the coefﬁ  cient to positive and signiﬁ  cant (Column 2), 
a pattern consistent with the income shifting hypothesis. The signs of coefﬁ  cients on 
HOLDING and RELATIVESIZE are consistent with the income shifting hypothesis and 
are signiﬁ  cant. The pattern is robust to inclusion of a host of control variables including 
time dummies, dummy for publicly-listed corporations, own industry dummies, parent 
industry dummies, and region dummies (Column 3). The positive coefﬁ  cient on Year 
1992 dummy reﬂ  ects the onset of recession after the collapse of the bubble economy. The 
signiﬁ  cantly negative coefﬁ  cient on the public corporation dummy reﬂ  ects the stringent 
criteria for being listed on the stock exchange, but it may in part capture the disincentive 
to reduce proﬁ  ts artiﬁ  cially out of the concern about market valuation.
  Since the Antitrust Regulation places stronger restriction on group formation by 
the ﬁ  nancial/insurance parents, the sample has been split (Column 4–5). The coefﬁ  cient 
on    in the ﬁ  nancial/insurance is three times as large as in the other sectors, being con-
sistent with the conjecture that the tighter restriction on mergers renders income shifting 
attractive in the sector. The industry differences in proﬁ  tability alone would not explain 
this ﬁ  nding, since the likelihood of zero-proﬁ  t reporting is relative to another group of 
ﬁ  rms in the same sector.
  Note that the coefﬁ  cient on HOLDING is negative and signiﬁ  cant for the other 
sectors (Column 4). Though this result is inconsistent with the income shifting hypothesis, 
given the lower standard deviation on HOLDING for the other sectors—29 as compared 
to 45 percentage points in the ﬁ  nancial/insurance— it is possible that the low holding may 
not accurately reﬂ  ect the degree of control in other sectors. For the ﬁ  nancial/insurance 
sector, where the ﬁ  ve per cent rule puts exogenous restriction on the level of intra-group 
shareholding, the coefﬁ  cient on HOLDING is positive and signiﬁ  cant. Overall, the results 
of the baseline estimation are largely consistent with the income shifting hypothesis.
Extensions
Table 4 includes additional proxy for shifting costs: dummies for the subsidiary that shares 
headquarter address and company representative with another group member. The result 
on the pooled sample shows that both indicators are positive and signiﬁ  cant (Column 1), 
but the strength of the relationship is somewhat sensitive to the sample speciﬁ  cation, espe-
cially with regard to the coefﬁ  cient on the shared headquarter (Columns 3 and 5). Part of 16
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the reason may be that in the ﬁ  nancial/insurance, after controlling for HOLDING, these 
variables have no explanatory power. Interaction terms with the proxy for shifting costs 
and LARGE are generally positive but not signiﬁ  cant, indicating that large subsidiaries 
with low shifting costs are not signiﬁ  cantly more likely to report zero proﬁ  t.
Table 4: Baseline model with additional explanatory variables
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
  pooled  pooled  Non F&I  Non F&I  F&I  F&I
LARGE = 1  0.042**  0.032**  0.030**  0.022+  0.147**  0.125**
 (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.036)  (0.042)
HOLDING 0.014**  0.013**  -0.010*  -0.010*  0.092**  0.090**
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.013)
OFFICE SHARE  0.008*  0.008*  0.003  0.003  0.017  0.013
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.011)
SAME HEAD  0.012**  0.011**  0.011**  0.010**  0.006  0.004
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.014)
RELSIZE -0.387**  -0.388**  -0.399**  -0.400**  -0.209  -0.202
 (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.374)  (0.361)
AGE -0.235**  -0.235**  -0.202**  -0.202**  -0.767**  -0.769**
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.108)  (0.106)
AGE SQ  0.201**  0.202**  0.151**  0.152**  0.859**  0.866**
 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.195)  (0.191)
PUBLIC -0.029+  -0.028      0.326  0.344
 (0.016)  (0.017)      (0.224)  (0.224)
LN(PCAP) -0.027**  -0.027**  -0.023**  -0.023**  -0.056**  -0.056**
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.005)
YEAR1990 -0.009**  -0.009**  -0.011**  -0.011**  0.016  0.017
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.012)
YEAR1992 0.009**  0.009**  0.006*  0.006*  0.035**  0.036**
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.013)
LXH -  0.008  -  0.006  -  0.009
 -  (0.011)  -  (0.013)  -  (0.047)
LXadd -  -0.001  -  0.000  -  0.073
 -  (0.012)  -  (0.012)  -  (0.091)
LXrep  - 0.011 -  0.011 -  0.033
 -  (0.011)  -  (0.011)  -  (0.080)
Observations 33340  33340  30332  30332  3008  3008
Pseudo R-squared  0.14  0.14  0.12  0.12  0.31  0.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ signiﬁ  cant at 10%; * signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%
All regression include dummies for own industry, headquarter location, and a constant.
Except F&I sectors, parents' industry dummies are included.
PUBLIC is ommitted in non F&I sub-sample because all public corporations reported non-zero proﬁ  ts.
  The tax penalty, and thus the tax incentive to shift income, arises only when some 
group members are making losses while others are making proﬁ  t. Our study so far used 
a sample that includes all observations regardless of the overall proﬁ  tability of the group. 
Since the incentives to shift income would be more pressing for groups in which the 
proﬁ  tability varies among members, we have tried excluding observations from proﬁ  t-
able groups to check sensitivity. Here, a group is deﬁ  ned to be proﬁ  table if x per cent 17
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of group members reports positive proﬁ  t in the respective year, so that the proﬁ  tability 
is based on the unweighted count of group members. The cut-off percentages we have 
tried are 100, 90, 80 and 70 per cent. The sample is based on all sectors as it is generally 
representative of the sub-sample.
  By excluding such observations, we would expect to observe a stronger correla-
tion between the explanatory variables and the incidence of zero-proﬁ  t reporting for the 
tax reason, provided that the excluded observations are sufﬁ  ciently similar to included 
observations. If, for instance, the fraction of large corporations in excluded observations 
is greater, the coefﬁ  cient on LARGE from the remaining sample mechanically increases 
since excluded large-corporations would mostly be reporting non-zero proﬁ  t. Thus, cau-
tion is required in interpretation.
  Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 reproduces the baseline result excluding 
3,103 observations that are in groups where some group member did not report proﬁ  t. 
Column 2 excludes 4,828 observations in groups with all members reporting proﬁ  ts. 
Table 5: Exclusion of proﬁ  table groups
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
  balanced  [ , 1)   [ , 9)   [ , 8)   [ , 7)
LARGE  =  1  0.046** 0.054** 0.055** 0.072**  0.076**
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)  (0.017)
HOLDING  0.012** 0.015** 0.018** 0.022**  0.033**
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.010)
OFFICE SHARE  0.010*  0.018**  0.017**  0.021**  0.025*
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.010)
SAME  HEAD  0.013** 0.015** 0.015** 0.021**  0.028**
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.008)
RELSIZE  -0.370** -0.323** -0.356** -0.442**  -0.510**
  (0.047) (0.059) (0.063) (0.083)  (0.110)
AGE  -0.220** -0.253** -0.266** -0.322**  -0.314**
  (0.021) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039)  (0.054)
AGE  SQ  0.176** 0.193** 0.199** 0.241**  0.212*
  (0.034) (0.042) (0.047) (0.064)  (0.089)
LN(PCAP)  -0.029** -0.036** -0.039** -0.047**  -0.054**
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)
YEAR1990  -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.020*
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.009)
YEAR1992 0.020**  0.016**  0.014**  0.005  -0.011
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.008)
Observations  30237 25409 23210 15918  10673
Pseudo  R-squared  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14  0.16
Fraction LARGE =1  0.188   0.188   0.187   0.178   0.171 
Standard errors in parentheses
+ signiﬁ  cant at 10%; * signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%
All regression include dummies for own industry, parents' industry, headquarter location, and a constant18
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The coefﬁ  cient on LARGE increases by 0.08 as expected under the hypothesis. Since 
the fraction of large corporations is identical to three decimal points, it is likely that not 
all of the increase is attributable to the mechanical effects, but rather, attributable to 
tax incentives. The subsequent restrictions on the sample also increase the coefﬁ  cient 
(Columns 3–5), but it is difﬁ  cult to attribute to the tax incentives as the fraction of large 
corporations decreases. Cautions are required in interpreting these results, but at the least, 
Table 5 shows that the results are qualitatively robust to excluding samples that would 
have smaller tax incentives.
Robustness check
As noted earlier, the available data is on book income rather than tax income. To check the 
sensitivity to the deﬁ  nition of proﬁ  t, we tried alternative speciﬁ  cations of the dependent 
variable under different assumptions about the reporting discrepancy. The ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  ca-
tion assumes that the tax proﬁ  t of zero corresponds to a range of book proﬁ  t around zero, 
thereby zero proﬁ  t is deﬁ  ned to be a range of (-2, 2) million yen. The second speciﬁ  cation 
assumes that tax incomes are systematically smaller than book incomes, and the range 
for book proﬁ  t coded as zero proﬁ  t is (-1, 3).27 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 shows that 
estimates are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the discrepancy between the two 
concepts is unlikely to be a serious concern.19
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  In the main analysis, HOLDING enters linearly in the regression. To account for 
the possibility that income shifting involves subsidiaries with a certain minimum degree of 
control, two discrete speciﬁ  cations of this variable are tried. The ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  cation replaces       
HOLDING with the dummy variable for 75 per cent or more of voting shares being con-
trolled by the group. The second speciﬁ  cation uses the dummy for being wholly-owned 
subsidiary. Table 6 presents the result. For the ﬁ  nancial/insurance sector, the estimated 
marginal effects on the holding variable are very similar between the speciﬁ  cations. It 
reﬂ  ects the regulation that causes the variable to be close to discrete in the ﬁ  rst place. 
For the sub-sample of other industries, the level of holding has no explanatory power. 
Table 6: Speciﬁ  cation tests
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  PROFIT1  PROFIT2  NON F&I  NON F&I  F&I  F&I
LARGE = 1  0.054**  0.059**  0.025**  0.025**  0.048*  0.048*
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.024)
HOLDING 0.017**  0.017**  -  -  -  -
 (0.005)  (0.006)  -  -  -  -
OFFICE SHARE  0.018**  0.029**  -0.005  -0.005  -0.001  -0.001
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
SAME HEAD  0.014**  0.010*  0.003  0.003  -0.014  -0.014
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
RELSIZE -0.762**  -0.761**  -0.018  -0.017  0.431**  0.424**
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.048) (0.048) (0.108) (0.110)
AGE  -0.378** -0.410** -0.090** -0.089** -0.337** -0.337**
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) (0.106) (0.106)
AGE SQ  0.324**  0.326**  0.046  0.046  0.365+  0.365+
  (0.038) (0.046) (0.030) (0.030) (0.208) (0.208)
PUBLIC -0.038  -0.039  -  -  0.319  0.374
 (0.029)  (0.033)  -  -  (0.216)  (0.244)
LN(PCAP)  -0.051** -0.064** -0.008** -0.008** -0.022** -0.022**
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
YEAR1990 -0.012**  -0.013**  -0.011**  -0.011**  0.016  0.016
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
YEAR1992 0.010*  0.011*  0.005*  0.005*  0.019+  0.019+
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
LN(SALES) -  -  -0.021**  -0.021**  -0.032**  -0.032**
 -  -  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.004)
LN(WORKER) -  -  0.001 0.001  0.008*  0.008*
 -  -  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)
q100 -  -  -  -0.000  -  0.083**
 -  -  -  (0.002)  -  (0.014)
q75 -  -  -0.001  -  0.081**  -
  -  - (0.002) - (0.014)  -
Observations 33340 33340 29348 29348 2880  2880
Pseudo  R-squared  0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ signiﬁ  cant at 10%; * signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%
All regressions include dummies for own industry, headquarter location, and a constant.
Parent's industry dummies are included except for F&I subsamples.
PUBLIC is ommitted in non F&I subsample because all public corporations reported non-zero proﬁ  ts.
The range of zeroproﬁ  t for PROFIT1 and PROFIT2 is (-2,2) and (-1,3) respectively.20
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In sum, the results regarding the level of HOLDING are generally not sensitive to the 
speciﬁ  cation.
  Finally, the functional form of the size control poses a trade-off in the model speci-
ﬁ  cation choice. Since the identiﬁ  cation of the tax effects on large corporation is based on 
a dummy variable for size exceeding the tax threshold, control variables based on under-
Table 7: Flexible size controls
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)
LARGE = 1  0.036**  0.027**  0.008  0.005
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.005)
HOLDING  0.011** 0.015**  0.012** 0.015**
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)
OFFICE  SHARE  0.003 -0.002  0.003 -0.003
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)
SAME  HEAD  0.007* 0.001  0.007* 0.000
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)
RELSIZE -0.351**  0.010  -0.363**  -0.032
  (0.078) (0.046)  (0.078) (0.048)
AGE  -0.206** -0.105**  -0.211** -0.111**
  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019) (0.019)
AGE  SQ  0.160** 0.071*  0.168** 0.075*
  (0.027) (0.029)  (0.027) (0.030)
PUBLIC -0.028+  -0.021  -0.041**  -0.035**
  (0.016) (0.017)  (0.006) (0.007)
YEAR1990  -0.009** -0.008**  -0.009** -0.009**
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)
YEAR1992  0.007* 0.006*  0.007* 0.007*
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)
LN(PCAP) -0.024**  -0.010**  -0.040**  -0.023**
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)
LN(WORKER) -  0.003*  -  0.000
  - (0.001)  - (0.003)
LN(SALES)  - -0.023**  - -0.032**
  - (0.001)  - (0.004)
LN(PCAP) SQ  -  -  0.003**  0.002**
 -  -  (0.000)  (0.000)
LN(SALES)SQ -  -  -  0.001*
 -  -  -  (0.000)
LN(WORKER)SQ -  -  -  0.000
 -  -  -  (0.000)
Observations  32228 32228  32228 32228
Pseudo  R-squared  0.12 0.16  0.13 0.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
+ signiﬁ  cant at 10%; * signiﬁ  cant at 5%; ** signiﬁ  cant at 1%       
All regressions include dummies for own industry, parent's industry, headquarter location, and a constant.
The sample in this table omits 1,112 observations with missing information on workers and/or sales21
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lying (untransformed) size inevitably capture some of the effects of the taxes, especially 
when it is in a ﬂ  exible form.28 We think the log-linear speciﬁ  cation is appropriate for the 
purpose of this study since the speciﬁ  cation avoids attributing the tax effects to the aver-
age size-effects. Given the concern about speciﬁ  cation errors, and to be conservative, we 
consider the estimates based on the log-linear speciﬁ  cation as an upper bound and those 
based on ﬂ  exible forms as a lower bound.
  As a basis for comparison, Column 1 of Table 7 presents the result of a baseline 
model with a sample that omits observations with missing information on the number of 
workers and/or sales. Column 2 includes in the regression the log of number of workers 
and log of sales as additional controls. The coefﬁ  cient on LARGE is lowered but is statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant. Column 3 includes a quadratic control of paid-in capital. As expected, the 
point estimate is positive but is insigniﬁ  cant, since the quadratic controls would attribute 
increases in the propensity to report zero proﬁ  t to the average sizeeffects. The results are 
similar when including quadratic controls for other size variables. Overall, based on the 
estimates from Column 2 and 4, our analysis indicate that the tax incentives increase the 
propensity for large corporations to report zero proﬁ  t by 0.5–2.7 percentage points on 
average.
Concluding remarks
This paper considered perverse incentives caused by the tax law asymmetries in a corpo-
rate income tax that lacks an explicit allowance for loss offsets with group members. We 
argued that to the extent that corporate groups are formed for business purposes, the 
income shifting within corporate groups is an unintended consequence of government’s 
failure to account for the group behaviour in the tax law. Taken as a whole, the ﬁ  ndings 
are highly suggestive of income shifting being pervasive among large Japanese capital 
keiretsu around the early 1990s.
 Our  ﬁ  ndings underscore the importance of accounting for group behaviour in cor-
porate taxation. Under the CITs of most nations, there is no consolidated ﬁ  ling of taxes, 
in spite of the consolidated ﬁ  nancial reporting becoming the global standard; it seems 
reasonable to suspect that income shifting is pervasive among corporate groups in such 
nations. In this view, the introduction of consolidated ﬁ  ling of 2002 is a step forward for 
Japan’s tax system. Yet, the nation’s tax system contains various inconsistencies in how 
groups of corporations are treated. For example, consider the special depreciation deduction 
for small companies, which provides against subsidiaries of large corporations beneﬁ  ting 
from the scheme.29 There is, however, no restriction placed on the same subsidiaries from 22
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paying taxes at the reduced rate intended for small stand-alone corporations. Our paper 
calls for further amendments to the tax system to reﬂ  ect the business practices.
  Finally, we interpreted the evidence as being driven by the tax motives based on 
our model of income shifting that predicts the excessive tendency to report zero proﬁ  t by 
large corporations. But one may argue that the other motives for within-group transfers, 
particularly the risk sharing (Nakatani 1984; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Khanna and Yafeh 
2005) and the tunnelling (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002; Morck, Wolfenzon 
and Yeung 2005), being the main driving force behind the pattern, with perhaps the tax 
incentive playing a minor role.30 It is beyond the scope of the current paper to distinguish 
between different motives for within-group transfers. As such, we view this paper as an 
early step in understanding the importance of tax motives in interpreting the within-group 
transfers. It would be of interest to undertake further studies to see if the tendency to 
report zero proﬁ  ts is reduced once groups start ﬁ  ling consolidated tax returns.
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Appendix 1
To simplify the problem (7), divide the domain of s into three segments 
,,, a n d , yy ym ym 0 22 2 2 3 ++ _i 88 BB  . Denote the solution to the problem by s*. 
First, note that the solution cannot be in the last range, i.e.,   , sy m
*
2 3 ! + Y _i . For                   
,, > sy m s
b
2 2 3 ! + r _ ^ i h , so that the marginal tax rate faced by the subsidiary is  H x
. Since the parent also faces  H x  when they are proﬁ  table, there is no tax savings from an 
additional s in this range. Thus, to save on transaction costs, the ﬁ  rm will not shift more 
than  ym 2 + . 
Second, consider the range  , sy 0 2 ! Y 8 B. The subsidiary reports income of zero or below, 
since the amount of shifting in this range is no greater than the amount of loss. In general, 
the after-tax income of the parent can be positive or negative; in the absence of transaction 
costs, the condition (1) guarantees that the parent reports positive income, but depending 
on the costs of shifting, the parent can report negative income. However, we can ignore 23
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the case of negative income. To see why, suppose that there is a value for s, y 0 2 ! t 8 B   
such that  < s 0
b
1 r t ^h . Since we also have  < s 0
b
2 r t ^h , the overall income must be negative, 
that is,  < ss 0
bb
12 + rr tt ^^ hh . Given the condition (1), the ﬁ  rm makes positive proﬁ  t without 
shifting income,  < 01 0 0 H 1 2
b -+ xr r ^ ^^ h hh , so that s t is dominated by s 0 = . In other 
words, at the optimum, the parent must have positive proﬁ  t,  > ys g s 0 1 --^h . Thus, 
the parent faces  H x , and the ﬁ  rm’s optimisation problem becomes (10). 
 







-- xx ^ ^ h h         ( 1 0 )
Note that there is no explicit inequality constraint on a parent’s proﬁ  t, but since it can 
be veriﬁ  ed that the constraint holds with a slack, the constraint on a parent’s proﬁ  t is not 
included here. The ﬁ  rst order conditions for the problem are
 
y
s 10 HH -- -= xx
}
m r
^h         ( 1 1 )
  ,> ys00 2 += mm ^h          ( 1 2 )
The solution for this restricted problem is summarised as: 




H = - x
x } r cm        ( 1 3 )
Third, consider the problem with the restriction that  , sy y m 22 ! + 8 B. The subsidiary fac-
es the marginal rate of  L x  in this range. The parent faces  H x  by a similar argument to above. To 
see that the parent must have positive income, suppose that at s, < my s 0 2 1
b =+ r tt ^h . Since 
my m 2 2
b += r _i , the overall proﬁ  t is  < my sm m 1 2 1
b
L += +- rx P t _ ^ ^ i h h
. s t cannot 
be the optimal value, since the proﬁ  t without shifting income is  > yy m 01 H1 2 =- + x P^ ^ h h  
by assumption, i.e., s t is dominated by s 0 = . It follows that for any other value of s in 
the range,  > s 0 1
b r ^h . Thus, the problem can be written as
  







-- - xx x ^^ ^ hh h      (14)
The ﬁ  rst order conditions for the problem are
 
y
s 10 HL H 12 -- - - + = xx x
}
mm r
^^ hh       (15)
  ys m0 12 +- = m ^h          ( 1 6 )
  ys0 22 -- = m ^h           ( 1 7 )
  ,0 12 $ mm            ( 1 8 )
The solution to the problem is summarised as







xx } r cm < F      (19)24
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By combining the two solutions, we obtain










xx } rr cm < F )3    (20)
Appendix 2
This note demonstrates the underestimation of tax effects in a regression with a ﬂ  exible 
size control. One way to identify the effects of tax incentives would be to compare the 
actual fraction of corporations reporting zero proﬁ  t with the predicted fraction based 
on the sample without the cap. To the extent that the tax incentives are inﬂ  uential, we 
would expect to observe the actual fraction to be greater than the predicted fraction. As 
an example, we examine the propensity to report zero proﬁ  t using a probit model with 
a cubic function of the log of paid-in capital as the control.
In Figure A1, the long-dotted line shows the predicted fraction of zero-proﬁ  t corpora-
tions based on the model estimated on a sample below 100 million yen in paid-in capital. 
The ﬁ  gures are averaged over intervals with the width of 0.2. The amount above 4.6, 
which corresponds to  n 11 0 0 ^h  , is therefore an out-sample prediction, representing the 
pattern that would have prevailed had the relationship between the propensity to report 
proﬁ  t and the corporate size remained as it was below 100 million. Broadly speaking, 
the fraction declines over the size. However, the out-sample prediction is generally low 
compared to the actual ﬁ  gure, indicating a systematically high incidence of zero proﬁ  t 
among large corporations unexplained by the level of size.
Now consider the short dotted line, which is an in-sample prediction based on the estimates 
from the whole sample. As the model is ﬁ  t to the data, any effects of taxes are absorbed 
into the coefﬁ  cients on the size controls, so that the predicted values trace the actual 
values closely. Thus, by incorporating a ﬂ  exible size control in the analysis presented in 
the text, the tax effects would inevitably be underestimated.
Notes
1  The twenty-nine countries include those that adopt a consolidated ﬁ   ling or ﬁ   scal unity of afﬁ  liated 
corporations, even if the allowance is restricted to certain industries. 
2   See the simulation by Majd and Myers (1987) on the impact of tax asymmetry on the after-tax net present 
value of a stand-alone project.
3   Corporate groups may be formed for pervasive reasons, such as to take advantage of the preferential treatment 
of small businesses (Onji 2007). The income shifting in such contexts is problematic in exacerbating the 
existing problem.
4   See Westney (1998) for a descriptive study of capital keiretsu, referred to as vertical keiretsu in his paper. 
Shimotani (1993) provides a through documentation in Japanese. On horizontal keiretsu, see for instance, Flath 
(2005) and Kester (1989). Granovetter (1995) offers a review of international corporate groupings.25
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5   Samphantharak (2003) uses the entity-level data from Thailand to study the internal capital market in 
business groups.
6   See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for an updated review of the literature. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) document 
several examples of rescue operations in the post-war Japan.
7   For simplicity, here, we assume that the law determining the tax base is common regardless of corporate 
size.
8   The rate is for non-dividend income of corporation with paid-in capital exceeding 100 million yen. Unlike 
the CIT in the U.S., the tax rate is ﬂ  at for this category of income. Taxes include the corporate income 
tax, the corporate inhabitant tax, and the corporate enterprise tax. See Ishi (2001) for a nice overview of 
the Japanese tax system.
9   For a detailed discussion, see Altshuler and Auerbach (1990).
10   To qualify for these beneﬁ  ts, corporations need to ﬁ  le their tax return in a speciﬁ  c format, known as blue 
form, but nearly all corporations do so in recent years. There was a temporary disallowance between April 
1992 and March 2000 (Ishi 2001, p168).
11   PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002). Some countries allow proﬁ  table companies to take over the losses of 
another group company. In New Zealand, a proﬁ  table company can make subvention payment to an 
unproﬁ  table company and deduct the expense.
12   The limit varies by company and is computed as the simple average of 2.5 per cent of income and 0.25 
per cent of paid-in capital.
13   Since the deduction for intra-group contribution is aggregated with other contributions, there is a concern 
about the crowding out of charitable donation.
14   In a recent high-proﬁ  le case involving subsidiaries of Marubeni, a major general trading company, a gasoline 
wholesaler is found shifting the timing of rebates totaling around 300 million yen paid to ﬁ  ve gas station 
operators to utilize losses made in them (Yomiuri Shimbun/Daily Yomiuri, July 2, 2005, p.19).
15   Strictly speaking, the tax law in general permits these types of transactions so long as the amount of income 
shifted is treated as contribution.  
16   As an example, there is a strategy on the compensation of executives. Since bonuses to executives are not 
tax deductible but severance payments are deductible, ﬁ  rms have incentives to reward executives in form 
of severance pay rather than paying them bonuses. By making senior executives ‘hop around’ afﬁ  liated 
companies, making severance payments each time, the group tax liability is lowered.
17   Certain exceptions were made under the tax reform of 2001, which is well after our sample period, to 
facilitate business restructurings much needed during the prolonged recession.
18   Since merging company retains losses carried forward, the merger may be an option, if so-called up-side-
down merger, an operation referring to a loss-making company merging a proﬁ  t-making company, is 
feasible.
19   In practice, income below 4 million yen is taxed at 38.9 per cent. This is ignored for simplicity.
20   A consideration in a model with more than two members is the possibility of parceling out of proﬁ  t by 
small amount to numerous subsidiaries. Depending on the cost function assumed, such a strategy would 
reduce the overall incidence of zero-proﬁ  t reporting, but it would not change the limits to the amount of 
shifting.
21   There is no apparent clustering on the after-tax proﬁ  t equivalent to 8 million yen in before-tax income, 
but this might be due to the presence of multiple small companies as discussed.
22   It might appear that the effects of the tax threshold can be better analysed by the regression discontinuity 
design. However, for corporations just above the threshold to forego the preferential tax treatments, there 
must be some business reasons that analysts cannot observe in the dataset.
23  Although Desai (2005) reports that book and tax income diverge considerably in the U.S. data, the breakdown 
in the relationship does not happen until the mid-1990s. If the technology for accounting manipulation 
developed concurrently in Japan, then the two notions of corporate income should be reasonably close 
since the sample year is before the mid-1990s.
24   This roughly translates to the range (-$7,000, $7,000) using the average dollar–yen exchange rate is $1=¥ 
150 in 1990.
25   A recent high-proﬁ  le case includes the criminal indictment of Kanebo Co. (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 
19, 2005).
26   The result from logit model is qualitatively the same and is available from the corresponding author.
27   The ranges of alternative deﬁ  nition are restricted by the data publisher’s reporting procedure to round off 
ﬁ  gures below one million yen.
28   As a demonstration of this point, Appendix 2 ﬁ  ts a ﬂ  exible model ﬁ  t to the data. We then compare it 
with an extrapolation based on the sample of small corporations and show that for large corporations the 
observed fraction of zero-proﬁ  t reporting is greater than the predicted.
29   National Tax Agency, 2007. Chūshō kigyōsha tou no shōgaku genka shukyaku shisan no shutoku kakaku no 
sonkin sannyū no tokurei (Special rule on the acquired price of small depreciable asset for small- and medium-
sized enterprises), No. 5408, National Tax Agency, Japan. Available from http://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/26
Asia Paciﬁ  c Economic Papers
hojin/5408.htm (accessed 29 October 2007). Here, a small company refers to a joint-stock corporation 
with paid-in capital less than 100 million yen that is ﬁ  ling separate tax return from its parent.
30   Another explanation involves the accounting gimmickry involving so-called ‘hidden assets’. Hidden assets 
arise from the discrepancy between the value of assets in the balance sheet, which is recorded in book value, 
and the value in the market. There is a well-known strategy to offset operation loss, available to corporations 
that hold hidden assets: a corporation sells an asset, realises its hidden value while offsetting operation loss, 
and repurchases it immediately. Such a ﬁ  nancial operation allows ﬁ  rms to window-dress ﬁ  nancial statements, 
and to realise the capital gain without invoking tax liability. To the extent that the strategy is limited to 
subsidiaries that are large, tightly controlled, and/or with lower relative size, the estimated coefﬁ  cients on 
these explanatory variables would pick up the accounting-gimmick effect. 
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